Adversarial Detection of Flash Malware: Limitations and Open Issues by Maiorca, Davide et al.
1Adversarial Detection of Flash Malware:
Limitations and Open Issues
Davide Maiorca, Member, IEEE, Battista Biggio, Senior Member, IEEE,
Maria Elena Chiappe, and Giorgio Giacinto, Senior Member, IEEE,
Abstract—During the past two years, Flash malware has become one of the most insidious threats to detect, with almost 600 critical
vulnerabilities targeting Adobe Flash Player disclosed in the wild. Research has shown that machine learning can be successfully used
to tackle this increasing variability and sophistication of Flash malware, by simply leveraging static analysis to extract information from
the structure of the file or from its bytecode. However, the robustness of such systems against well-crafted evasion attempts - also
known as adversarial examples - has never been investigated. In this paper, we first discuss how to craft adversarial Flash malware
examples, and show that it suffices to only slightly manipulate them to evade detection. We then empirically demonstrate that popular
defense techniques proposed to mitigate such threat, including re-training on adversarial examples, may not always be effective. We
argue that this occurs when the feature vectors extracted from adversarial examples become indistinguishable from those of benign
data, meaning that the given feature representation is intrinsically vulnerable. In this respect, we are the first to formally define and
quantitatively characterize this vulnerability, highlighting when an attack can be countered by solely improving the security of the
learning algorithm, or when it requires also considering additional features. We conclude the paper by suggesting alternative research
directions to improve the security of learning-based Flash malware detectors.
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1 INTRODUCTION
THe significant evolution of network-based services hasallowed users to easily access a comprehensive, wide
multimedia infrastructure that greatly improves the over-
all Internet surfing experience. It is common to visualize
high-quality streams from web pages, to navigate web-
sites through complex animations, and to play graphically-
advanced games from social networks. Although HTML 5 is
nowadays considered the standard de facto to efficiently ren-
der multimedia contents, Adobe Small Web Format (SWF,
previously known as ShockWave Flash) is still widely used,
although many reports predict a fast decline for this technol-
ogy. Major streaming websites such as CBS, CNN, Spotify,
and HBO still rely on SWF technology [25].
SWF suffered from numerous security problems in the
past two years. According to cvedetails,1 there were 329
publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in 2015, and 266 in 2016.
That, of course, does not include zero-day vulnerabilities
such as the one found in the Hacking Team servers during
the popular attack perpetrated in 2015 [4]. The Hacking
Team incident also provoked a massive media uproar, forc-
ing browser vendors to take additional security measures
concerning Flash player, such as making updates com-
pulsory for the user in order to visualize the multimedia
content. However, this is just a weak palliative that does
not completely solve the whole problem, for at least two
reasons. First, security updates only concern publicly dis-
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closed vulnerabilities; second, not all security issues are
rapidly patched. A more secure defense strategy is therefore
required not only to ensure protection against zero-day
attacks, but also to foresee novel threats.
Signature-based detection of malware, which is still
widely employed by many free and commercial anti-
malware systems, is progressively getting inadequate to
address the myriad of polymorphic attacks that are gen-
erated every second in the wild. This also applies to the
detection of SWF-based malware, whose scripting code
(ActionScript) contains heavily obfuscated routines that
aim to confuse both automatic and manual analysis. The
adoption of machine learning, combined with static or dy-
namic analysis of the embedded scripting code, has become
a compelling alternative to signatures or rule-based sys-
tems. With respect to SWF malware, static analysis showed
promising results at detecting malicious samples in the wild
by extracting information either from the structure of the
file [27] or from the ActionScript bytecode [34].
Previous work has however not discussed the robustness
of such approaches against evasion attacks, namely, well-
crafted manipulations of the input sample at test time
to evade detection. More specifically, research has shown
that machine-learning algorithms are vulnerable to such at-
tacks [8], [11] - also recently referred to as adversarial examples
in the context of deep learning [17], [28] - if the attacker
possesses enough information about the system, and if she
can perform enough changes to the extracted features. Such
attacks have been reported also against Android and PDF
malware detectors, but not against learning-based Flash
malware detection tools [8], [15], [18], [26]. Several coun-
termeasures have also been proposed to mitigate the impact
of such attacks, with the goal of reshaping the decision func-
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2tion of the classifier with different techniques [?], [9], [13],
[15], [17], [26]. For instance, game-theoretical approaches
require retraining the classifier on simulated attacks until
a game equilibrium between the classifier and the attacker
is reached, providing formal guarantees for its existence and
uniqueness [?], [13]. In the context of deep neural networks,
although the underlying assumptions behind existence and
uniqueness of a game equilibrium are not typically satis-
fied, the idea of retraining the learning algorithm on the
attack samples, referred to as adversarial training, has been
empirically shown to be promising [17].
The main goal of this paper is thus to understand
whether and to which extent systems that statically analyze
SWF files can be robust against adversarial attacks, i.e.,
to propose a thoroughly security evaluation procedure for
learning-based SWF malware detectors based on static anal-
ysis. To this end, we first propose a representative system
for Flash malware detection, named FlashBuster. It is
a static machine-learning system that employs information
extracted by both the structure and the content of SWF
files. This allows for a more comprehensive assessment
of the extracted static information, by representing and
combining the content employed by previous state-of-the-
art systems. We show that FlashBuster is able to detect
the majority of malware in the wild, thus confirming results
obtained in previous work. We then evaluate the security
if FlashBuster by simulating evasion attacks with differ-
ent levels of the attacker’s knowledge about the targeted
system [8], [11] (also referred to as white-box and black-
box attacks), against an increasing number of modifications
to the input samples. The corresponding security evaluation
curves, depicting how the detection rate decreases against
attack samples that are increasingly manipulated, allow us
to comprehensively understand and assess the vulnerabil-
ity of FlashBuster under attack. We finally discuss the
effectiveness of adversarial training against such attacks. To
this end, we re-train FlashBuster on the evasion attack
samples used against it, and surprisingly show that this
strategy can be ineffective. We argue that this is due to an
intrinsic vulnerability of the feature representation, i.e., to the
fact that evasion attacks completely mimic the feature values
of benign data, thus becoming totally indistinguishable for the
learning algorithm. We define this vulnerability in formal
terms, and quantitatively evaluate it through the definition
of a specific metric which measures the extent to which the
attack samples converge towards benign data.
Our findings highlight a crucial problem that must be
considered when designing secure machine-learning sys-
tems, namely, that of evaluating in advance the vulnerability
of the given features. Indeed, vulnerable information may
compromise the whole system even if the employed deci-
sion function is robust. In this respect, we sketch possible
research directions that may lead one to design more secure
machine learning-based malware detectors.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
the basics to understand the SWF format. Section 3 provides
the fundamentals of the ActionScript bytecode. Section
4 describes the architecture of FlashBuster. Section 5
describes the threat model and the possible attack scenarios.
Section 6 discusses the vulnerabilities that affect learning-
based systems, and introduces a quantitative measure of
feature and learning vulnerabilities. Section 7 provides the
experimental evaluation. Section 8 describes the related
work in the field. Section 9 discusses and closes the paper.
2 SHOCKWAVE FLASH FILE FORMAT
ShockWave Flash (SWF) is a format that efficiently delivers
multimedia contents, and it is processed by the Adobe Soft-
ware such as Adobe Flash Player.2 Because of its compact-
ness and adaptability to the most popular web browsers,
SWF has been widely used for online applications such as
games, animations, etc.
In this Section, we provide an overview of the SWF
format, by focusing on the analysis of its main components.
Moreover, we provide an insight into the ActionScript
Virtual Machine (ASVM), which is used to parse scripted
contents that might be found in the SWF file.
2.1 SWF Basics
This Section describes the main blocks of a SWF file, which is
composed of three basic elements: (1) a header that describes
important file properties such as the presence of compres-
sion, the version of the SWF format, and the number of
video frames; (2) a list of tags, i.e., data structures that
establish and control the operations performed by the reader
on the file data; (3) a special tag called End that terminates
the file.
The SWF format supports two types of tags: definition
and control. Definition tags assign a number called character
ID to each object shown by the reader. For example, the
DefineFont and DefineSprite tags assign an ID, respec-
tively, to a font and a sprite. Such IDs are then placed on a
dictionary that will be accessed by control tags to establish
which elements will be visualized on each frame.
Action tags represent special types of control tags whose
functionalities are triggered by user actions, such as pressing
a button, moving the mouse, and so forth. Starting from
SWF 5, such actions were expanded by the introduction of a
scripting language called ActionScript. With the release
of its latest version (3.0), ActionScript code is now com-
piled to an entirely new bytecode called ActionScript
Bytecode (ABC), and run by the ActionScript Virtual
Machine 2 (ASVM 2). More about the SWF file structure can
be found on the official SWF reference [3].
2.2 ActionScript Virtual Machine
This Section describes the essentials of ASVM 2, the new
version of the ActionScript Virtual Machine, released in
2006. The introduction of characteristics such as Just In Time
compilation (JIT), namespaces, and packaging, brought to
huge speed improvements compared to the previous ver-
sion. The computation in the ASVM 2 is based on the execu-
tion of method bodies composed by instructions. Each method
body runs in a specific context that defines information such
as default parameters.
ASVM 2 runs ABC files in four stages: (i) loading, where
the ABC file is copied in memory; (ii) linking, where complex
data structures are created; (iii) verification, where all the
2. https://get.adobe.com/en/flashplayer/
3resolved data structures are verified to be coherent; (iv)
execution, where the file is compiled through JIT compilation
and executed.
More about ASVM 2 can be found on the official VM
references [2]. For the purposes of our paper, it is now
important to provide a description of the bytecode contents,
as FlashBuster relies on analyzing such information to
perform detection.
3 ACTIONSCRIPT BYTECODE (ABC)
To simplify the comprehension of the static methodology
employed in this paper, we provide an example of how
a simple method written in ActionScript is compiled
into ABC bytecode, by disassembling and decompiling an
application.3
This method is a constructor of the class PingServers
that performs three operations: (i) A superclass
is invoked; (ii) The method addCallback of the
ExternalInterface class is called to make the
ActionScript code interact with external containers
(e.g., JavaScript, HTML files, and so forth). In particular,
this method registers the function pingCallback so
that it could be called by the container with the constant
name RESPOND_PINGDATA; (iii) The instance variables
pingTimer and pingTimeouts are set to zero. More
about ActionScript programming can be found on the
official ActionScript reference [1].
From the perspective of the ActionScript bytecode,
such operations can be summed up as follows: (i) The su-
perclass is invoked through the instructions get_local_0,
pushscope and constructsuper (lines 12-15). As such
instructions are not relevant for the scope of this paper,
we recommend reading the ActionScript specifications
for more insights [2]; (ii) The addCallback method is
invoked through the instructions findpropstrict and
getproperty (lines 16-24). Such instructions respectively
look and fetch the required packages, classes and meth-
ods. The resolution of such names is made through data
structures called Names, which are very important for the
scope of our paper. We will describe them more in detail
later on; (iii) The fields pingTimer and pingTimeouts are
set to zero with the instructions get_local_0, pushbyte,
pushnull and initproperty. Again, Name structures are
important to define which package and class the fields
belong to.
From the description above, it is clear that Name struc-
tures play a very important role at defining which classes
and methods are invoked by the ActionScript code. We
now provide an insight into such structures.
3.1 Names
Names are data structures composed by one unqualified name
(for example, a class name) and one or more namespaces
that typically represent the packages from which classes or
methods are resolved. The Name resolution can occur either
at compile time or at runtime. Additionally, there might
be multiple namespaces from which the same unqualified
3. There might be multiple ways to express the disassembled code as
ActionScript source code.
1 //ActionScript decompiled code
2 public function PingServers()
3 {
4 super();
5 ExternalInterface.addCallback(Cmd.RESPOND_PINGDATA,this
.pingCallback);
6 this.pingTimer = 0;
7 this.pingTimeouts = null;
8 }
9
10
11 //ActionScript equivalent bytecode
12 getlocal_0
13 pushscope
14 getlocal_0
15 constructsuper 0
16 findpropstrict Qname(PackageNamespace("flash.external"),"
ExternalInterface")
17 getproperty Qname(PackageNamespace("flash.external"),"
ExternalInterface")
18 findpropstrict Qname(PackageNamespace("com.xvm.io"),"Cmd")
19 getproperty Qname(PackageNamespace("com.xvm.io"),"Cmd")
20 getproperty Qname(PackageNamespace(""),"RESPOND_PINGDATA")
21 getlocal_0
22 getproperty Qname(PrivateNamespace("xvm.ping.PingServers:
PingServers"),"pingCallback")
23 callproperty Qname(PackageNamespace(""),"addCallback") 2
24 pop
25 getlocal_0
26 pushbyte 0
27 initproperty Qname(PrivateNamespace("xvm.ping.PingServers:
PingServers"),"pingTimer")
28 getlocal_0
29 pushnull
30 initproperty Qname(PrivateNamespace("xvm.ping.PingServers:
PingServers"),"pingTimeouts")
31 returnvoid
Listing 1: An example of how Actionscript code (lines 1-
8) is compiled into ABC Bytecode (lines 11-31). Debug
information have been removed for the sake of brevity.
name can be obtained. The choice of the appropriate Names-
pace from a list of candidates typically occurs at runtime.
According to the number of namespaces, Names can be
subdivided in two categories:
QName. A data structure composed by one unqualified
name and one namespace. This is the simplest Name struc-
ture that can be found. Both the name and the namespace
are resolved at compile time.
Multiname. A data structure composed by one unqualified
name and a set of namespaces. The resolution is performed
at compile time. Hence, each of the namespaces in the set
can be properly used for the name.
When a name is retrieved at runtime, it is typically
loaded from the constant pool when it is needed.
3.2 SWF Malware
In order to better understand the approach proposed
in this paper, Listing 2 shows a typical action per-
formed by an ActionScript-based malware (MD5:
92711a995ecdd0663b608bd664b2ca89), which exploits
the CVE-2015-3133 (according to VirusTotal) vulner-
ability, which allows to remotely execute arbitrary code
due to memory corruption. As we did in the first part
of Section 3, we describe the aforementioned actions by
showing both the decompiled ActionScript source and
the disassembled bytecode. The code in the Listing reads an
UnsignedByte from the object _loc1_, which is an object
of the class IG (note: this name was originally obfuscated
41
2 //Decompiled ActionScript
3 ...
4 _loc1_ = new IG();
5 _loc1_.endian = Endian.LITTLE_ENDIAN;
6 _loc1_.position = 0;
7 this.isAS3 = _loc1_.readUnsignedByte() - 1;
8
9 //Disassembled Bytecode
10 ...
11 findpropstrict Qname(PackageNamespace(""),"IG")
12 constructprop Qname(PackageNamespace(""),"IG") 0
13 coerce Qname(PackageNamespace("flash.utils"),"ByteArray")
14 setlocal_1
15 getlocal_1
16 getlex Qname(PackageNamespace("flash.utils"),"Endian")
17 getproperty Qname(PackageNamespace(""),"LITTLE_ENDIAN")
18 setproperty Qname(PackageNamespace(""),"endian")
19 getlocal_1
20 pushbyte 0
21 setproperty Qname(PackageNamespace(""),"position")
22 getlocal_0
23 getlocal_1
24 callproperty Qname(PackageNamespace(""),"readUnsignedByte")
0
25 decrement
Listing 2: Part of the malicious code contained in the
92711a995ecdd0663b608bd664b2ca89 sample. Such
function is represented by its decompiled output (lines 4-
7) and by its equivalent bytecode output (lines 11-25).
with non ASCII characters). Such class inherits (see the
coerce instruction) from the flash.utils.ByteArray
built-in class. The code then performs a subtraction and
assigns the output to the variable isAS3. Such value will
be then copied to another array of bytes (we did not re-
port this action for space reasons). Note how the reading
is performed by following the little endian (by using the
flash.utils.Endian) byte order. From the name of the
decompiled variable, we assume that the byte sequences
might be related to a code that is copied somewhere else.
Manipulating information in this way is very common
in Flash-based malware. It is interesting to observe how
system API methods and classes are essential for the at-
tacker to build shellcodes or to perform buffer overflows
or heap spraying attacks. This often happens, as the official
ActionScript API allows to easily manage low-level data
structures.
4 FLASHBUSTER ARCHITECTURE
FlashBuster is a static, machine learning-based system
whose goal is to detect malicious SWF files and to distin-
guish them from benign ones. This is achieved by lever-
aging information provided by the tag structure and the
ActionScript bytecode of the file. Our goal was in partic-
ular to reproduce a combination of the main characteristics
of previous state-of-the-art systems (see Section 8), which
proved to be effective at detecting SWF malware.
Figure 1 shows the general architecture of the system,
which can be divided in three modules:
Parser. This module analyzes the SWF file and extracts infor-
mation about its structure and its ActionScript bytecode.
Feature Extractor. This module transforms the information
obtained from the parser in a vector of numbers, which
characterizes the whole SWF file.
Preprocessing
Structural Features
Bytecode Features
Classifier
Benign/Malicious[x1,…xn]Tag/Code
Fig. 1: Graphical architecture of FlashBuster.
Classifier. This module decides on the maliciousness of
the SWF file basing on the feature vector it receives as
input. Such module is a mathematical function that tunes its
parameters by receiving a number of examples taken from a
so-called training set. Once its parameters have been set up,
the classifier is able to recognize malicious files that have
not been included in the training examples.
In the following, we provide a more detailed description
of each component of the system.
4.1 Parser
As previously said, this module performs data preprocess-
ing and selects the information that will be further processed
by the other modules. FlashBuster leverages a modified
version of JPEXS, a powerful, Java-based Flash disassem-
bler and decompiler.4 This software is based on RABCDasm,
one of the most popular Flash disassemblers, and it adds
new features such as de-obfuscation, file debugging and
preview, etc.
In particular, the parser featured by FlashBuster per-
forms the following operations: (i) It performs static de-
obfuscation of ActionScript code. This is important, as
some of the malicious files might use name obfuscation
or other popular techniques to conceal the attacks. (ii) It
extracts the complete SWF structure in terms of tags. (iii)
It disassembles the ABC bytecode so that it could be read
as a plain-text file. Such operation includes automatic de-
obfuscation of the ActionScript code. Both the tag struc-
ture and the ABC bytecode are sent to the feature extractor
module for further analysis.
4.2 Feature Extraction
This module is the core of the whole system. It converts the
information extracted by the parser to a vector of numbers
that will be sent to the classifier. As the information is related
both to the structure and the content of the SWF file, we
now provide a detailed description of the features extracted
in the two cases.
4.2.1 Structural Features (Tags)
These features are related to the information that can be
extracted from the SWF tags, and are crucial to understand
which objects and actions are executed by the SWF file. The
main idea here is that malware does not contain particularly
complex multimedia contents, such as video with a lot of
frames or audio files. A lot of malware samples simply
display images such as rectangles or blank backgrounds. For
this reason, we extract the following 14 features from the
4. https://www.free-decompiler.com/flash/download/
5file structure, corresponding to the number of occurrences
of specific SWF tags within the file:
Frames. this feature counts the tag ShowFrame that is used
to display frames.
Shapes. this feature counts the tag DefineShape (in any of
all its four variants), used to define new shapes that will be
plot on the screen.
Sounds. this feature checks the presence of sound-
related events by counting any of the following tags:
DefineSound, SoundStreamHead1, SoundStreamH-
ead-2 and SoundStreamBlock.
BinaryData. this feature counts groups of embedded data,
represented by the tag DefineBinaryData.
Scripts. this feature counts how many ActionScript
codes are contained in the file. A SWF file does not neces-
sarily require such code to perform its operations, especially
in benign files (ActionScript has been initially thought
as an aid to the execution of SWF files). This is done
by analyzing the following tags: DoABC, DoABCDefine,
DoInitAction, DoAction.
Fonts. this feature counts font-related objects, by detecting
any of the following tags: DefineFont (in all its variants),
DefineCompactedFont, DefineFontInfo (in all its vari-
ants), DefineFontName.
Sprites. this feature counts the number of sprites by exam-
ining the tag DefineSprite.
MorphShapes. this feature counts the number of morphed
shapes, (i.e., shapes that might transform into new ones) by
examining the tag DefineMorphShape (and its variants).
Texts. this feature counts text-related objects by checking
any of the following tags: DefineText (along with its
variants) and DefineEditText.
Images. this feature counts the images contained in the
file by examining any of the following tags (and their
variants): DefineBits, DefineBitsJPEG, JPEGTables
and DefineBitsLossless.
Videos. this feature counts the number of embedded
videos by examining the tags DefineVideoStream and
VideoFrame.
Buttons. this feature counts the buttons with which the
user can interact with the SWF content. This is done by
examining the tag DefineButton (along with its variants).
Errors. this feature counts the errors made by the parser
when analzying specific tags. This often happens, for exam-
ple, when the SWF file is malformed due to errors in its
compression.
Unknown. this feature counts the tags that do not belong to
the SWF specifications (probably malformed tags).
The reader can find more information about these tags
on the official SWF specification [3].
Despite being effective, structural features must be care-
fully treated, as benign and malicious files can be similar to
each other in terms of their tag structure. For this reason,
structural features alone are not enough to ensure a reliable
detection, and must be integrated with information from the
scripted content of the file.
4.2.2 Actionscript Bytecode Features (API calls)
As structural features (i.e., tags) might suffer from the limi-
tations mentioned in Sect. 4.2.1, we employed an additional
set of features that focus on the content of the scripting code
that might be included in the file. Although it is not strictly
necessary to use ActionScript for benign operations, its
role is essential to execute attacks. In particular, as shown
in Sect. 3.2, the attacker usually needs to resort to system
APIs to perform memory manipulation or to trigger specific
events. Moreover, APIs can be used to communicate with
external interfaces or to contact an external URL to automat-
ically drop malicious content on the victim’s system.
System APIs belong to the official Adobe
ActionScript specifications [1]. For this reason, we
created an additional feature set that checks the presence
or absence of all the classes and methods belonging to
such specifications. This leads to 4724 new features. More
specifically, this feature set represents the number of specific
System methods and classes inside the bytecode. We chose
to use only system-based APIs for two reasons: (i) the
feature vector does not include user-defined APIs, so that
the feature list is independent on the training data that is
considered for the analysis; (ii) system-based calls are more
difficult to obfuscate, as they are not directly implemented
by the user.
With respect to the example described in Sect. 3.2,
we therefore consider as features the classes flash.
utils.ByteArray and flash.utils.Endian, and the
method readUnsignedByte. On the contrary, we do not
consider the class IG, as it was directly implemented by
the user. The rationale behind counting the occurrences
of system-based methods and classes is that an attacker
might systematically use functions such as readByte or
writeByte to manipulate the memory. Alternatively, she
might attempt to repeatedly trigger events or to access
specific interfaces. Counting the occurrences might also
increase the required effort by the attacker to evade the
classification algorithm.
4.3 Classification
The features extracted with FlashBuster can be used
with different classification algorithms. In the experimental
evaluation we describe in Section 7, we tested different clas-
sification algorithms. In particular, we focused our attention
on SVM and Random Forests, as these were successfully
employed in several other malware detection tasks [27], [34].
5 ATTACK MODEL AND SCENARIOS
To assess the security of FlashBuster against adversarial
manipulation of the input data (which can be either per-
formed at training time or at test time), we leverage an
attack model originally defined in the area of adversarial
machine learning [10], [11]. It builds on the well-known
taxonomy of Barreno et al. [6], [7], [19] which categorizes
potential attacks against machine-learning algorithms along
three axes: security violation, attack specificity and attack influ-
ence. By exploiting this taxonomy, the attack model enables
defining a number of potential attack scenarios, in terms of
explicit assumptions on the attacker’s goal, knowledge of
the system, and capability of manipulating the input data.
65.1 Attacker’s Goal
It is defined in terms of two characteristics, i.e., security
violation and attack specificity.
Security violation. In security engineering, a system can be
violated by compromising its integrity, availability, or privacy.
Violating the integrity of FlashBuster amounts to having
malware samples undetected; its availability is compromised
if it misclassifies benign samples as malware, causing a
denial of service to legitimate users; and privacy is violated
if it leaks confidential information about its users.
Attack specificity. The specificity of the attack can be targeted
or indiscriminate, based on whether the attacker aims to have
only specific samples misclassified (e.g., a specific malware
sample to infect a particular device or user), or if any
misclassified sample meets her goal (e.g., if the goal is to
launch an indiscriminate attack campaign).
We formalize the attacker’s goal here in terms of an
objective function W(A′,θ) ∈ R which evaluates to which
extent the manipulated attack samples A′ meet the at-
tacker’s goal.
5.2 Attacker’s Knowledge
The attacker may have different levels of knowledge of the
targeted system [6], [7], [10], [11], [19], [32]. In particular,
she may know completely, partially, or do not have any
information at all about: (i) the training data D; (ii) the
feature set X , i.e., how input data is mapped onto a vector
of feature values; (iii) the learning algorithm L(D, f), and
its decision function f(x), including its (trained) parameters
(e.g., feature weights and bias in linear classifiers), if any. In
some applications, the attacker may also exploit feedback
on the classifier’s decisions to improve her knowledge of
the system, and, more generally, her attack strategy [7], [10],
[11], [19].
The attacker’s knowledge can be represented in terms of
a space Θ that encodes knowledge of the data D, the feature
space X , the learning algorithm L(D, f) and its decision
function f . In this work, we will simulate both limited- and
perfect-knowledge attacks, as detailed below.
5.2.1 Limited-Knowledge (LK) Black-Box Attacks
Under this scenario, the attacker is typically only assumed
to know the feature representation X and the learning algo-
rithmL, but not the training dataD and the trained classifier
f . This is a common assumption under the security-by-
design paradigm: the goal is to show that the system may
be reasonably secure even if the attacker knows how it
works but does not know any detail on the specific deployed
instance [7], [8], [10], [11], [15], [19].
In particular, according to the definition proposed by
Biggio et al., we distinguish the cases in which either the
training data or the trained classifier are unknown [23]. In
the first case, to which we refer as LK attacks with surrogate
data,it is often assumed that the attacker is able to collect
a surrogate dataset Dˆ and that she can learn a surrogate
classifier fˆ on Dˆ to approximate the true f [8], [24]. Note
also that the class labels of Dˆ can be modified using feedback
provided from the targeted classifier f , when available (e.g.,
as an online service providing class labels to the input data).
The knowledge-parameter vector can be thus encoded as
θLK−SD = (Dˆ,X ,L, fˆ).
In the second case, to which we refer to as LK attacks
with surrogate learners, we assume that the attacker knows
the training distribution D, but not the learning model.
Hence, she trains a surrogate function on the same train-
ing data. Hence, the knowledge-parameter vector can be
encoded as θLK−SL = (D,X , Lˆ, fˆ).
5.2.2 Perfect-Knowledge (PK) White-Box Attacks
This is the worst-case setting in which also the targeted
classifier is fully known to the attacker, i.e., θ = (D,X ,L, f).
Although it is not very likely to happen in practice that the
attacker gets to know even the trained classifier’s param-
eters, this white-box setting is particularly interesting as it
provides an upper bound on the performance degradation
incurred by the system under attack, and can be used as
reference to evaluate the effectiveness of the system against
the other (less pessimistic) attack scenarios.
5.3 Attacker’s Capability
The attacker’s capability of manipulating the input data is
defined in terms of the so-called attack influence and on the
basis of some application-specific constraints.
Attack Influence. This defines whether the attacker can only
manipulate data at test time (exploratory influence), or if she
can also contaminate the training data (causative influence).
This is possible, for instance, if the system is retrained
online using data collected during operation which can be
manipulated by the attacker [7], [11], [19].
Application-specific constraints. These constraints define
how and to which extent the input data (and its features)
can be modified to reach the attacker’s goal, according to the
given application. In many cases, these constraints can be
directly encoded in terms of distances in feature space, com-
puted between the source malware data and its manipulated
versions [8], [13], [14], [16], [21], [29]. FlashBuster is not
an exception to this rule, as we will discuss in the remainder
of this section. In general, the attacker’s capability can thus
be represented in terms of a set of possible modifications
Ω(A) performed on the input samples A.
5.4 Attack Strategy
The attack strategy amounts to formalizing the derivation
of the attack in terms of an optimization problem [8],
[11]. Given the attacker’s goal W(A′,θ), along with a
knowledge-parameter vector θ ∈ Θ and a set of manipu-
lated attacks A′ ∈ Ω(A), the attack strategy is given as:
A? = arg maxA′∈Ω(A) W(A′;θ) . (1)
Under this formulation, one can characterize different attack
scenarios. The two main ones often considered in adver-
sarial machine learning are referred to as classifier evasion
and poisoning [6]–[8], [10]–[12], [19], [22], [23], [35]. In the
remainder of this work we focus on classifier evasion, while
we refer the reader to [11], [22], [23], [35] for further details
on classifier poisoning.
75.5 Evasion Attacks
Evasion attacks consist of manipulating malicious samples
at test time to have them misclassified as benign by a trained
classifier. The attacker’s goal is thus to violate system in-
tegrity, either with a targeted or with an indiscriminate attack,
depending on whether the attacker is targeting a specific
machine or running an indiscriminate attack campaign.
More formally, evasion attacks can be written in terms of
the following optimization problem:
z? = arg min
z′∈Ω(z)
fˆ(Φ(z′)) , (2)
where x′ = Φ(z′) is the feature vector associated to the
modified attack sample z′, x = Φ(z) is the feature vector
associated to the source (unmodified) malware sample z,
Φ is the feature extraction function, and fˆ is the surrogate
classifier estimated by the attacker. With respect to Eq. (1),
note that here samples can be optimized one at a time, as
they can be independently modified.
As in previous work [8], [11], [15], we first simulate the
attack at the feature level, i.e., we directly manipulate the
feature values of malicious samples without constructing
the corresponding real-world samples while running the at-
tack. We discuss in Sect. 5.7 how to create the corresponding
real-world evasive malware samples. The above problem
can be thus simplified as:
x∗ = arg minx′ fˆ(x
′) (3)
s.t. ‖x′ − x‖1 ≤ k , xlb  x′  xub , (4)
where we have also made the manipulation constraints
Ω used to attack FlashBuster explicit. In particular, the
box constraint xlb  x′  xub (in which the inequality
holds for each element of the vector) bounds the minimum
and maximum feature values for the attack sample x′. For
FlashBuster, we will only consider feature injection, i.e.,
we will only allow injection of structural and bytecode
features within the SWF file to avoid compromising the
intrusive functionality of the malware samples. This can be
simply accounted for by setting xlb = x. The additional `1
distance constraint ‖x′ − x‖1 ≤ k thus sets the maximum
number k of structural and bytecode features (i.e., tags and
API calls) that can be injected into the file. The solution
to the above optimization problem amounts to identifying
which features should be modified to maximally decrease
the value of the classification function, i.e., to maximize the
probability of evading detection [8], [11]. Clearly, this set of
features varies depending on the input sample x.
5.6 Evasion Attack Algorithm
If the objective function (i.e., the decision function of the
classifier) f is not linear, as for kernelized SVMs and random
forests, Problem (3)-(4) corresponds to a nonlinear pro-
gramming problem with linear constraints. The solution is
therefore typically found at a local minimum of the objective
function. Problem (3)-(4) can be solved with standard algo-
rithms, but this is not typically very efficient, as such solvers
do not exploit specific knowledge about the evasion prob-
lem. We thus devise an ad-hoc solver based on exploring a
descent direction aligned with the gradient ∇fˆ(x′) using
a bisect line search, similar to that used in our previous
Algorithm 1 Evasion Attack
Input: x, the malicious sample; x(0), the initial location of
the attack sample; fˆ , the surrogate classifier (Eq. 3); k,
the maximum number of injected structural and byte-
code features (Eq. 4); xlb and xub, the box constraint
bounds (Eq. 4); , a small positive constant.
Output: x′, the evasion attack sample.
1: i← 0
2: repeat
3: i← i+ 1
4: t′ = arg mint fˆ(Π(x
(i−1) − t∇fˆ(x(i−1))))
5: x(i) ← Π(x(i−1) − t′∇fˆ(x(i−1)))
6: until |fˆ(x(i))− fˆ(x(i−1))| < 
7: return x(i)
work [26]. Its basic structure is given as Algorithm 1. To
minimize the number of iterations, we explore one feature at
a time (starting from the most promising feature, i.e., the one
exhibiting the highest gradient variation in absolute value),
leveraging the fact that the solution will be sparse (as the
problem is `1 constrained). We also minimize the number of
gradient and function evaluations to further speed up our
evasion algorithm; e.g., we only re-compute the gradient of
fˆ(x) when no better point is found on the direction under
exploration. Finally, we initialize x(0) twice (first starting
from x, and then from a benign sample projected onto the
feasible domain), to mitigate the problem of ending up in a
local minima that does not evade detection.5
5.7 Constructing Adversarial Malware Examples
A common problem when performing adversarial attacks
against machine learning is evaluating whether they can be
truly performed in practice. As gradient-descent attacks are
performed at the feature level, the attacker is then supposed
to solve the so-called inverse feature-mapping problem, i.e., to
reconstruct from the obtained features the sample that can
be deployed against the classifier itself [11], [15], [19].
Most of times, such operation is not easy to perform,
not only from a more theoretical standpoint (as discussed
in [19]), but also from a more practical perspective. In the
specific case of Flash malware, and of malware in general,
generating the corresponding real-world adversarial exam-
ples may be complicated, as a single wrong operation can
compromise the intrusive functionality of the embedded
exploitation code [15]. For example, removing one structural
feature such as one frame or script might totally break the
SWF file. This is why we consider only injection of additional
content into the SWF file.
Constructing the real-world adversarial example (i.e., the
malicious evasive SWF file) is a rather straight-forward pro-
cess in our case. In particular, it is possible to inject structural
features by using JPEXS. With its graphical interface, it is
possible to deliberately add control and structural tags. It
is also possible to inject bytecode features by editing the
5. This problem has been first pointed out in [8], where the authors
have introduced a mimicry term to overcome it. Here we just consider
a different initialization mechanism, which allows us to get rid of the
complicated mimicry term in the objective function.
8output disassembled by RABCDasm and re-assembling the
file (this can be also graphically done with JPEXS).
For the purposes of this paper, we created some working
proof-of-concepts, where structural and content-based fea-
tures were deliberately and manually added by using the
aforementioned tools. However, we plan as future work to
make the creation process automatic.
6 ON THE VULNERABILITY OF FEATURE SPACES
AND LEARNING ALGORITHMS
We discuss here an interesting aspect related to the vulner-
ability of learning-based systems, first highlighted in [9],
[26] and conceptually represented in Fig. 2, which shows
two classifiers on a two-feature space. The classifiers can
be defined as surfaces closed around malicious (left) and
benign (right) samples. The red, blue and green samples
represent, respectively, malicious, benign and attack sam-
ples. An evasion attack sample is typically misclassified as
either: (i) its feature vector is far enough from those belonging
to the rest of known training samples (both malicious and
benign), or (ii) it is indistinguishable from those exhibited
by benign data. In the former case, usually referred to as
blind-spot evasion, retraining the classifier on the adversar-
ial examples (with adversarial training) should successfully
enable their detection, improving classifier security. This
means that the classification error induced by such attacks
could have been reduced in advance, by designing a learning
algorithm capable of anticipating this threat; for instance,
building a classifier that better encloses benign data, and
classifies as malicious the regions of the feature space where
training data is absent or scarce (see, e.g., the classifier in
the right plot of Fig. 2). We thus refer to this vulnerability
as a vulnerability induced by the learning algorithm (left plot
in Fig. 2). In the latter case, instead, retraining the classifier
would be useless, as the whole distribution of the evasion
samples is overlapped with that of benign data in feature
space, i.e., the attack increases the Bayesian (non-reducible)
error. We thus refer to this attack as mimicry evasion, and to
the corresponding vulnerability as a vulnerability induced
by the feature representation (right plot in Fig. 2). In fact, if a
malware sample can be modified to exhibit the same feature
values of benign data, it means that the given features are
intrinsically weak, and no secure learning algorithm can
prevent this issue.
This notion can also be motivated in formal terms,
similarly to the risk analysis reported in [9]. From a
Bayesian perspective, learning algorithms assume an un-
derlying (though unknown) distribution p(x, y) govern-
ing the generation of benign (y = −1) and malicious
(y = +1) data, and aim to minimize the classification
error E(f) = E(x,y)∼p`(y, f(x)), where E is the expectation
operator, ` is the zero-one loss, and f is the classification
function returning the predicted class label (i.e., ±1). Let
us denote the optimal classifier achieving the minimum
(Bayesian) error on p with f?. It is clear that, if there is no
evidence p(x) of (training) data in some regions of the feature
space (usually referred to as blind spots), such regions can
be arbitrarily classified by f? as either benign or malicious
with no impact on the classification error (the expectation
on p will be anyway zero in those regions). This is precisely
blind-spot	evasion	
(learning	vulnerability)
mimicry	evasion	
(feature	vulnerability)
Fig. 2: Conceptual representation of learning (left) and feature
(right) vulnerability. Red, blue and green samples represent,
respectively, malicious, benign and attack samples.
the underlying reason behind the vulnerability of learning
algorithms to blind-spot evasion.
Within this setting, evasion attacks can be indeed
thought as a manipulation of the input samples x through
a function a(x), which essentially introduces a deviation
from the source distribution p(x, y). By denoting with
Ea(f) = E(x,y)∼p`(y, f(a(x))) the error of the classifier f
on the manipulated samples, with f ′ the optimal (Bayesian)
classifier on such manipulated data, we can compute the
increase in the classification error of f? on the manipulated
data as:
Ea(f
?)− E(f?) = Ea(f ′)− E(f?)︸ ︷︷ ︸
feature vulnerability
+ Ea(f
?)− Ea(f ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
learning vulnerability
.
(5)
The first term is the increase in Bayesian error before and
after the attack (which characterizes the vulnerability of
the feature representation), while the second represents the
classification error reducible by retraining on the attack
samples (i.e., the vulnerability of the learning algorithm).
Under this interpretation, we can introduce a metric to
quantitatively assess the feature vulnerability. To this end,
we first consider the so-called Bhattacharyya Coefficient
(BC):
BC =
∫
x∈X
√
pb(x)pm(x)dx ∈ {0, 1} . (6)
This coefficient essentially evaluates the overlapping be-
tween the distributions of benign pb and manipulated attack
pm samples over the whole feature space X . If the two
distributions are exactly the same, BC = 1, while if they
are perfectly separated, BC = 0. The convenient aspect of
this metric is that it has a closed form for several known
distributions; e.g., in the case of multivariate Gaussian dis-
tributions, it is given as BC = exp(−DB), where
DB =
1
8
(µb − µm)>Σ−1(µb − µm) +
1
2
log
detΣ√
detΣbdetΣm
,
Σ = 0.5(Σb + Σm), and µb, µm, Σb and Σm are the
means and covariance matrices of benign and attack data,
respectively. To assess feature vulnerability, we use this
expression for BC, and exploit the well-known result that
the Bayesian error is upper bounded by 12BC. Accordingly,
we measure the difference between such value computed
after and before the attack, which gives us an (approximate)
indication of the increase in the Bayesian error induced by
9the attack, and thus, a quantitative measure of the feature
vulnerability (i.e., of the first term in Eq. 5).
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The experimental evaluation proposed in this paper is di-
vided in three parts.
Standard Evaluation. FlashBuster was trained with a
dataset of randomly chosen malicious and benign SWF files,
and it was tested against a number of previously unseen
malicious and benign files. This experiment provides infor-
mation on the system general performances in terms of true
and false positives.
Adversarial Evaluation. In this experiment (directly linked
to the previous one), we evaluated the performances of
FlashBuster against adversarial attacks performed ac-
cording to a gradient descent strategy (see Section 5.5).
Temporal Evaluation. FlashBuster was trained with a
dataset of samples that had been first seen before a certain
year, and it was tested against a set of samples that had
been released after the same year. This test was performed
to ensure the capability of FlashBuster to predict novel
vulnerabilities and attacks.
In the following, we describe the dataset we employed
for our experiments, as well as the basic setup of the
preprocessing and feature extractor modules. This setup is
common to all the evaluations described in this Section.
7.1 Basic Setup
Dataset. The dataset used for our experiments is composed
of 6635 files, 2209 of which are malicious and 4426 are
benign. Notably, every analyzed file (including benign ones)
contains ActionScript 3 code. This is to avoid analyz-
ing files that do not contain ActionScript code, and
that are therefore most likely benign. The malicious files,
as well as part the benign ones, were retrieved from the
VirusTotal service.6 Other benign files were retrieved
from the DigitalCorpora repository.7
Preprocessing. As mentioned in Section 4.1, the original
JPEXS parser was modified to allow a faster analysis of
multiple SWF files, as well as a better integration with
the other components of FlashBuster. All data related
to tags and bytecodes are extracted and dumped to files,
in order to allow for subsequent analyses by the other
modules of FlashBuster. The extraction time may vary
from milliseconds to some minutes for very large files.
Feature Extraction. As we are counting the occurrence of
each feature, there can be a considerably high difference in
values between certain features and others. Considering the
possibility of adversarial attacks, this might give the attacker
more degrees of freedom to confuse the classifier. For this
reason, we adopted a feature normalization and selection
strategy that is composed of three stages:
(i) We established an upper limit for the feature values
in our dataset. For our experiments, we chose 10 as a rea-
sonable value that limits the number of injectable features
in a specific sample (in particular, the maximum amount is
6. https://www.virustotal.com
7. http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/govdocs
given by nf ∗ vmax), where nf is the number of employed
features and vmax is the feature maximum value. Without
limiting the feature values, it would be possible to generate
samples with anomalous values of specific features, which
would be rather difficult to be found in practice. Moreover,
performing perfect knowledge attacks without limiting the
values of the features is computationally very expensive.
To confirm that limiting the feature values does not in-
fluence classification performances, we repeated our experi-
ments with higher upper limits, without noticing significant
differences in performances.
(ii) We selected the 50 most occurring features in the
dataset. Such threshold has been chosen as it was the min-
imum value that did not affect classification performances
in our experiments. In particular, we extracted the features
with the highest score S, given by the following:
S = |p(xi|y = 1)− p(xi|y = −1)| (7)
where xi is the i-feature, whilst 1 and −1 are the labels
related to, respectively, malicious and benign file categories.
Each feature is taken only once.
(iii) All features were normalized with the popular tf-idf
strategy [5]. This was particularly crucial for SVM classifiers,
which perform best with normalized features.
Classification. We used the popular machine learning suite
Scikit-Learn8, which features the classifiers and the nor-
malization strategy we used in our evaluation.
Training Procedure and Classifiers. All the performed
evaluations (except the temporal one, which was carried
out on a completely different dataset) share the following
elements: (a) The dataset was randomly split by considering
50% of it as training set and the remaining 50% as test
set. All the classifier parameters were evaluated with a 5-
fold cross validation performed on the training set. We
repeated the whole procedure five times, in order to rule
out possible biases related to specific train/test divisions.
(b) We performed our tests on three classifiers: (i) Random
Forest; (ii) SVM with linear kernel; (iii) SVM with non-
linear (RBF) kernel. Additionally, considering the possi-
bility of the targeted attacks described in Section 5.5, we
retrained the SVM RBF and Random Forest classifiers by
adding to the original training set samples generated with
a gradient descent strategy. In particular, the training splits
were modified in the following way: for each training split,
we generated new attack samples by performing, on 1000
randomly chosen malicious training samples, 50, 100 and
150 changes. In total, 3000 samples were added to each
original training set split. Notably, adding too many features
to the samples would have led to the creation of anomalous
samples with unrealistic feature values.
7.2 Standard Evaluation
The standard evaluation was performed by following the
criteria described in Section 7.1. In particular, for each clas-
sifier we calculated the average (among its splits) Receiving
Operating Characteristic (ROC). Figure 3 shows the results
of the evaluation. From this experiment, we see that Ran-
dom Forest was the classifier that generally performed best
8. http://scikit-learn.org/stable/
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Fig. 3: Average ROC curves obtained on 5 train-test splits.
The test was performed on three classifiers. In particular,
we also report the results for the retrained variant of SVM
RBF and Random Forests (RF). Vertical bars represent the
standard deviation among the splits.
at detecting malicious SWF files. At 1% of false positives,
the classifier was able to detect more than 80% of threats,
whilst at 2% the number of detected threats was higher than
98%. SVM with RBF kernel exhibited similar performances.
Linear models, on the contrary, poorly performed under 2%.
It may be expected that, being the generated attacks
more similar to benign samples, adding them to the training
set would decrease the performances of the classifiers. How-
ever, in our case, such operation only barely affected the
examined classifiers. We interpret this result with the fact
that gradient descent attacks create, in this case, malicious
samples that are still considerably different to the original
benign training distribution. For this reason, the classifiers
are still able to correctly discriminate malicious and benign
test samples.
7.3 Adversarial Evaluation
The adversarial evaluation aimed to assess the performance
of the classifiers employed in the previous experiment after
the gradient descent attacks described in Section 5.5. In this
case, we evaluated the performances of the classifiers in
terms of true positives (at 5% false positive rate) for a certain
number of changes k performed to the feature vector. Of
course, the more changes are performed by the algorithm,
the more effective the attack is.
It is important to observe that the experiments on SVMs
and Random Forests were carried out under different lev-
els of knowledge. Notably, Random Forests have a non-
differentiable classification function, and for this reason
the attacker cannot directly perform evasion on the target
model. In this case, according to the taxonomy described in
Section 5.5, we performed a Limited-Knowledge (LK) attack
with surrogate learners, in which a differentiable surrogate
model Lˆ is employed to craft the adversarial examples
instead of the target algorithm. To this end, in our ex-
periments, we used an SVM with the RBF kernel (whose
parameters were always evaluated by means of a 5-fold
cross validation performed on the training set), trained on
the same data D as the target classifier. Conversely, when
the attack is directly performed against the SVM classifier,
we simulated a Perfect-Knowledge (PK) attack scenario.
Figure 4 provides the results of the evaluation. While
all SVM-based classifiers were completely evaded after 100
changes, Random Forests could still detect 40% of the at-
tacks. This may be however due to the fact that the surrogate
model (SVM RBF) does not properly approximate the clas-
sification function of a Random Forest - i.e., the adversarial
examples crafted against the SVM do not transfer properly
against Random Forests. For this reason, we can not state
with certainty that Random Forests are generally more secure
(a more powerful white-box attack as that in [20] may enable
evading them with higher probability). We leave a more
detailed investigation of this aspect to future work.
Inefficacy of adversarial retraining. Notably, the employed
retraining strategy only brings little improvement to the
robustness of the classifiers. This can be better explained
by observing the distributions of average feature values for
one malicious test set before and after the attack against
SVM RBF, as well as the variation of the related Bhat-
tacharyya distance BC among the distributions (described
in Section 6). It is worth noting that such value has been
calculated under specific assumptions: (i) we approximated
our distributions as multivariate Gaussians; (ii) the isotropic
covariance Σ = 1/σ2I is identical for the two classes (being
I the identity matrix).
Figure 5 shows that the BC value increases according
to two criteria: (i) the increment of the number of changes
k; (ii) performing the attack against a retrained classifier.
This could further be explained by pointing out the dif-
ference between the Bayesian upper bound errors in case
of attack and without the attack (that we define here as
mimicry parameter) m = 12BCatt − 12BC , where BCatt is
the Bhattacharyya distance calculated after the attack, and
BC is the one calculated before the attack. Table 1 shows
how this value increases as more changes are performed,
and as classifiers are retrained.
TABLE 1: Values of the mimicry parameter m under multi-
ple attack scenarios.
Attack m
k = 100 (Retrain) .131
k = 50 (Retrain) .081
k = 100 .076
k = 50 .045
This shows that, although the function was retrained
against the attacks to reduce the learning vulnerability, the
feature vulnerability related to the employed static features
cannot be reduced by simply retraining the classifier. In
more detail, the problem here is that none of the employed
static features is likely to appear in malware much more frequently
than in benign data, i.e., there is no invariant feature that
characterizes malware uniquely from benign data (and that
can not be removed) [30]. This in turn means that it is
possible to create a malicious sample that is indistinguishable
from benign ones (even by only injecting content to the
input SWF file) and, thus, additional features are required
to correctly detect adversarial SWF malware examples.
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7.4 Temporal Evaluation
In this evaluation, we aimed to evaluate the capability of
FlashBuster to predict novel and zero-day attacks. To this
end, we trained the system by only using samples whose
first submission date to the VirusTotal service was before
2016 (1422 samples), plus all the benign files in the dataset.
The test set was therefore made of those malicious samples
released in 2016 (787 samples). We used all the classifiers
of the previous experiments. The goal of this analysis was
not to assess the performances of the system at detecting
general or adversarial attacks, but to evaluate the predictive
power of the features we employed against novel attacks. As
the previous experiments, the parameters of the classifiers
were evaluated with a 5-fold cross validation performed on
the training set.
Table 2 shows the results obtained from this evaluation.
It is possible to see that, considering non-retrained models,
the linear one performed best at detecting novel samples.
In particular, more than 77% of the tested samples were
detected. However, non-linear models also exhibited good
performances, with only a decrement of 8− 12% in compar-
ison to the linear model.
Notably, retrained models perform better than their non-
retrained variants. In particular, retrained SVM RBF exhibits
a 8% increment in comparison to the Linear model. This
means that generating artificial attacks with the gradient
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descent strategy makes the classifier more robust against
variants of known attacks. In particular, the gradient descent
attacks perform fine-grained, limited changes to the fea-
tures. These variations in the feature values are most likely
to occur when generating new attack variants. This is a
reasonable result, as the majority of novel malicious attacks
are directly derived from existing ones.
TABLE 2: Accuracy performances on five classifiers on a test
set composed of data released after 2016. Each classifier has
been trained with data released before 2016.
Classifier Accuracy
SVM RBF (Adv.) .851
SVM Linear .779
RF (Adv.) .75
SVM RBF .695
RF .657
8 RELATED WORK
As Flash-based malicious attacks started to considerably
grow in 2015, the number of detection approaches is rather
limited. FlashDetect [31] is one of the first approaches
to the detection of ActionScript 3-based malware. The
authors instrumented Lightspark, an open source Flash
viewer, to perform dynamic analysis of malicious Flash files.
From this analysis, the system extracts features such as the
number of ByteArray-related method calls, the presence of
the loadBytes method, and so forth. FlashDetect was
employed inside the Wepawet service, which is sadly not
available anymore.
Gordon [34] is an approach that resorts to guided-code
execution to detect malicious SWF files, by statically ana-
lyzing in particular their ActionScript bytecode. More
specifically, the system selects the most suspicious security
paths from the control flow graph of the code. Such paths
have usually references to security-critical call, such as the
ones for dynamic code loading. Although not publicly avail-
able, proved to be rather effective to detect Flash malware.
Hidost [33] is a static system that only focuses on the
structure of the SWF file. More specifically, it considers
sequences of objects belonging to the structure of the SWF
file as features. The system evaluates the most occurring
paths in the training dataset, and extracts features that
are based on the training data. This might be dangerous
from the perspective of targeted attacks, as a malicious
test file with completely different paths might be able to
evade detection. Moreover, the system does not analyze the
embedded ActionScript code. In this way, an attacker
might simply evade the system by perfectly mimicking the
structure of the file, regardless of the type of code it contains.
Besides scientific works, there are also some off-the-
shelf tools that are used to perform obfuscation of SWF
files (e.g., DoSWF9). Notably, in this paper we did not ana-
lyze FlashBuster performances against samples that have
been obfuscated by such tools. This is a different problem
with respect to the one we analyzed in Section 5.5. In this
case, obfuscation is performed without having knowledge
9. http://www.doswf.org/
of the target detection system. For this reason, the attacker
does not have the control of the features that are changed by
the attack. In this paper, we preferred focusing on the worst-
case scenario, in which the attacker possesses complete
knowledge of the target system.
We consider FlashBuster as a more complete variant
of the aforementioned static systems, where information
from both the structure and content of the file are extracted.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a security evaluation of static ma-
licious SWF files detectors by introducing FlashBuster,
a system that combines information analyzed by previous
state-of-the-art detectors (i.e., file structure and content). The
proposed security evaluation showed an intrinsic vulnera-
bility of the static features used by SWF detectors. In par-
ticular, by using gradient descent attacks, we demonstrated
how even retraining strategies are not always effective at
ensuring robustness. More specifically, we measured and
showed how gradient descent attacks make samples more
similar to their benign counterparts. We plan to improve
and solve some of the system limitations in future work:
for example, reducing its dependence on JPEXS, whose
possible failures could compromise the whole file analysis.
We also plan to perform more experiments on SWF files that
are obfuscated with off-the-shelf tools, in order to evaluate
the resilience of FlashBuster against them.
In general, our claim for future is research is that fo-
cusing on improving the classifier decision function can
be effective only if the employed features are intrinsically
robust. This means that there should be specific features that
are truly characteristic of malicious behavior and that cannot
be mimicked in benign files. The efforts to guarantee more
security should be therefore directed towards a security-
oriented design of the features.
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